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Abstract 
The Theory of Formal Discipline (TFD) suggests that studying mathematics 
improves general thinking skills. Empirical evidence for the TFD is sparse, yet it is 
cited in policy reports as a justification for the importance of mathematics in school 
curricula. The study reported in this paper investigated the extent to which influential 
UK advocates for mathematics agree with the TFD and their views on the arguments 
and evidence that surround it.  Quantitative and qualitative analysis of data from 
structured interviews revealed four themes: broad endorsement of the TFD; reference 
to supportive employment data; the possibilities that mathematics education might not 
always effectively develop reasoning and that study of other subjects might have 
similar effects; and concerns about causality and the extent of the evidence base.  We 
conclude that advocates broadly support the TFD despite being aware of its 
limitations.   
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Introduction 
It has long been assumed that people can be taught to think more rationally, 
and that mathematics is a useful tool to accomplish this. This view forms a part of 
what is known as the Theory of Formal Discipline (TFD): the idea that studying 
certain rigorous subjects, such as Latin, Greek or mathematics, can lead to the 
development of domain-general thinking skills, such as logical reasoning and critical 
thinking (Nisbett, 2009; Lehman, Lampert & Nisbett, 1988). Smith, Langston and 
Nisbett (1992) describe this as “one of the oldest views about the nature of thought” 
(p. 1), stemming from Plato’s theories of reasoning and education (see Plato, 
375BC/2003). Historically, the TFD has been advocated by both mathematicians and 
philosophers. The philosopher John Locke, for instance, suggested that mathematics 
be taught to ‘all those who have time and opportunity, not so much to make them 
mathematicians as to make them reasonable creatures’ (Locke, 1706, p. 20).  
In recent years the TFD has been endorsed in a variety of policy documents in 
the UK and beyond.  The influential Smith Report stated that as well as being 
important for its own sake, mathematics also ‘disciplines the mind, develops logical 
and critical reasoning, and develops analytical and problem-solving skills to a high 
degree’ (Smith, 2004, p. 11). Vorderman’s (2011) report on mathematics education, 
commissioned by the governing Conservative Party, stated that ‘mathematics is not 
only a language and a subject in itself, but it is also critical in fostering logical and 
rigorous thinking’ (p.3) and that the ‘analytical, logical and problem-solving skills 
which are acquired when studying mathematics have made mathematics graduates 
among the most employable of all university graduates and highly sought after in the 
workplace’ (p. 89). Walport’s (2010) policy report suggested that “[P]roblem solving 
abilities, perseverance and logic are [...] highly sought after and are commonly found 
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in those with a high level of competency in mathematics” (p.185). While the policy 
reports quoted here do not give the TFD as the primary motivation for mathematics 
education, they do cite it as one reason for the importance of teaching mathematics. 
Furthermore, both Stanic (1986) and Stanic and Kilpatrick (1992) argued that 
changes to the school-level mathematics curriculum in the US had been influenced by 
views related to the TFD. Stanic (1986) discussed how mathematics education 
became a distinct professional area in the 1890s, led by a humanist group, and was 
challenged in the 1930s by three other groups: the developmentalists, the social 
efficiency educators and the social meliorists. He describes the humanists as 
endorsing views closely related to the theory of formal discipline1: “According to the 
humanists, mathematics should be taught because it is an important part of our 
Western cultural heritage and (at least for some of the humanists) because of its 
unique contribution to the development of an individual’s reasoning ability.” (p.192). 
He specifically attributed this view to Young and Smith, leading mathematics 
education specialists at the turn of the century, who saw mathematics as “a vehicle for 
the development of reasoning power.” (p.193).”  
Similar to the humanist view of mathematics education is the “public 
educator” ideology described by Ernest (1991). Of the five educational ideologies 
Ernest describes, the “public educator” is favoured and most akin to the TFD. Ernest 
quotes Freire’s tenets of the public educator ideology, including that the aim of 
education is to achieve “a permanent critical approach to reality in order to discover it 
and discover the myths that deceive us and help to maintain the oppressing 
dehumanizing structures” (quoted in Dale et al, 1976, p 225). The public educator 
ideology in the context of mathematics suggests that an aim of mathematics is to help 
people become critical thinkers in the real world, with a particular application to 
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issues of social justice. A conflicting ideology is the Old Humanist, which sees 
mathematics as intrinsically valuable and culturally important. In this view, 
knowledge is worthwhile for its own sake regardless of applications to the real world. 
To the Old Humanists, the TFD might be seen as an idea about the value and purpose 
of mathematics education regardless of its validity. 
Positive views of the TFD are clearly present in the policy documents cited 
above, but these reports typically neither present direct evidence to support it nor 
problematize the extent to which senior advocates for mathematics agree about its 
truth.  What, then, are the views of those who influence contemporary educational 
policy?  Do they all endorse the TFD?  To what extent are they aware and critical of 
the associated evidence base?  This paper addresses these questions by reporting on 
interviews with advocates in the UK mathematics education policy community.  To 
frame the work, we begin by reviewing relevant empirical research.   
 
Evidence on the TFD 
The TFD can be traced back to Plato, who suggested that ‘Those who have a 
natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; 
even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training [...] become much quicker than 
they would otherwise have been’ (Plato, 375B.C/2003, p. 256). Based on this, he 
recommended that we should ‘encourage those who are to be the principal men of our 
state to go and learn arithmetic’ (Plato, 375B.C/2003, p. 256).  
Despite its long history, the TFD has been only minimally tested.  It was not 
until the early 20th century that Thorndike (1924) measured children’s general 
intelligence before and after a year of schooling and found that students’ subject 
choices had only a minor influence on changes in intelligence test scores: French, 
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chemistry and trigonometry were associated with the largest, albeit small, 
improvements, while arithmetic, geometry and algebra were associated with 
improvements barely above zero.  
Contrasting findings at higher educational levels have emerged more recently 
and in relation specifically to conditional reasoning skills.  Reasoning about 
conditional ‘if…then’ statements is an important component of logical reasoning in 
general (Braine, 1978; Inglis & Simpson, 2008), and is fundamental to mathematics in 
particular (Polya, 1954), and Lehman and Nisbett (1990) found evidence that studying 
mathematics at university level was associated with improved conditional reasoning 
skills. They tested US undergraduates in their first and fourth years on conditional 
reasoning as well as statistical and methodological reasoning, and found a correlation 
between number of mathematics courses taken and change in conditional reasoning 
behaviour across all majors (r = .31), with a stronger effect for natural science majors 
(r = .66).  
Conditional reasoning ability was also investigated by Inglis and Simpson 
(2009), who compared mathematics and non-mathematics undergraduates in the UK 
system in which students apply to study only one or two main subjects at university. 
They gave both groups of undergraduates a 32-item abstract Conditional Inference 
Task and observed that the mathematics undergraduates performed significantly better 
than the comparison undergraduates, even after controlling for differences in 
intelligence (measured using the AH5 test, Heim, 1968). However, when the 
mathematics students were re-tested at the end of their first year of study, there was an 
average improvement in conditional reasoning performance of only 1.8%, which did 
not approach significance. The lack of improvement left two possible explanations for 
the initial difference between groups on entry to university: either post-compulsory 
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but pre-university specialisation in mathematics was responsible, or those who are 
already better at conditional reasoning are disproportionately filtered into studying 
university-level mathematics.  
These possibilities were disentangled by Attridge & Inglis (2013), who 
investigated the development of conditional reasoning skills in mathematics and non-
mathematics A-level2 students. Attridge and Inglis found no between-group 
differences in conditional reasoning at the beginning of A-level, but after one year the 
mathematics students’ reasoning had significantly improved whereas the non-
mathematics students’ reasoning had not. This contradicts the filtering hypothesis and 
suggests that A-level mathematics influences conditional reasoning skills, in support 
of the TFD. 
Thus the evidence for the TFD is limited.  There is minimal evidence on the 
influence of mathematics on thinking skills in compulsory education; A-level 
mathematics appears to improve conditional reasoning skills (Attridge & Inglis, 
2013); and on undergraduate mathematics the evidence is mixed (Inglis & Simpson, 
2009; Lehman and Nisbett, 1990).  Nevertheless, the TFD has been used in several 
recent policy reports as one reason (among many others) to argue for mathematics to 
be prioritised in the UK National Curriculum, indicating that some advocates at least 
believe it to be justified. Our aim in the current paper is to explore this issue, 
investigating current advocates views on the TFD.  To accomplish this, we use data 
from interviews in which advocates were asked both to rate the extent to which they 
would expect mathematical training to improve students’ performance on reasoning 
tasks, and to respond to explicit claims made in relation to the TFD.    
 
Method 
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Participants and data collection 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with eight influential advocates in 
the UK mathematics education community. We sampled purposively (Patton, 2002), 
emailing to invite participation from expert individuals who had recently contributed 
to an organisation with significant influence over mathematics education policy. We 
have removed some affiliations for anonymity, but the participants included former 
advisers to the Higher Education Authority; a government minister with influence on 
educational policy, and university senior managers. In total, the sample was composed 
of six influential academic mathematicians, together with one politician and one 
academic mathematics educator (see Table 1). Whilst there are therefore some 
contrasting elements between participants’ roles, the common strand between 
interviewees is that they all have broader roles within mathematics education, and 
some influence on policy. This sample represents a particular group of advocates for 
mathematics education; we acknowledge that advocates for STEM subjects more 
generally may be very different to this group. 
Participants were approached sequentially and after informed consent was 
gained, analysis was conducted in an ongoing manner according to the principles of 
constructivist grounded theory methods (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 2006).  
We followed questions suggested by Charmaz (2006) to determine when theoretical 
saturation had been reached, asking what sense we had made of comparisons between 
data, and how these illuminated our categories. For example, “endorsement of TFD” 
was a category pertinent to the analysis of all interviews and the data were not 
saturated in this category until we had considered what this endorsement meant to 
participants, how they justified and critiqued it and how it affected other issues (such 
as unease regarding quality of the evidence base for the TFD). Recruitment was 
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curtailed when no significant new themes were emerging, after eight interviews. This 
is a small sample but it is possible to find that no new insights are emerging at such a 
point (Baker and Edwards, 2012). The size and sampling strategy limit the 
generalisability of findings. However, we are not claiming representativeness: rather, 
we considered a small scale, exploratory in-depth qualitative study appropriate in 
order to begin to investigate advocates’ views about the TFD. 
Interviews were conducted between January and May 2011 and lasted on 
average 56 minutes (range: 40 to 74). 
 
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
 
Procedure and materials 
Participants took part individually, in a one-to-one meeting with a researcher. 
Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.  The interview schedule opened with 
invitations to discuss quotations about the TFD (see Figure 1). Participants then used 
a Likert scale (1 – disagree to 5 – agree) to rate the extent to which they thought that 
studying post-compulsory mathematics would improve performance on 13 reasoning 
tasks: the abstract conditional inference task (Evans, Clibbens & Rood, 1995), a belief 
bias syllogisms task (Evans, Barston & Pollard, 1983), Raven’s advanced progressive 
matrices (Raven, Raven & Court, 1998), the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 
2005), the four card selection task (Wason, 1968), the THOG task (Wason & Brooks, 
1979), the argument evaluation task (Stanovich & West, 1997), the Watson Glaser 
evaluation, interpretation and assumptions tasks (Watson & Glaser, 1964), a problem-
solving task (Knoblich, Ohlsson  & Raney, 2001), a plausible estimation task (Swan 
& Ridgway, 2010) and a statistical reasoning task (Stanovich & West, 1998).  All 
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tasks appear in the Appendix (with the exception of Raven’s Matrices due to 
copyright). We selected a range of tasks, including abstract formal ones (e.g. abstract 
conditional inference) and contextual formal ones (e.g. belief bias syllogisms), which 
are more plausibly related to the TFD, and contextual informal ones (e.g. plausible 
estimation), which are less clearly related to the TFD, to investigate where the 
boundaries of the TFD would be in our participants’ opinions. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 near here] 
 
Interview analysis 
The interview data were analysed in NVivo 10 software (QSR International 
Pty Ltd., 2012) to facilitate the application of constructivist grounded theory methods.  
Major principles of these methods are that (i) individuals’ realities have categories 
which we can understand and broadly classify; (ii) as a social situation, the research 
process influences the data collected; (iii) as researchers we simply offer an 
interpretation of the data (Charmaz, 2006). Grounded theory uses codes as conceptual 
labels applying to phenomena indicated by the data, and initial codes are carefully 
considered to determine those that render the interpretation of the data most coherent; 
these become focused codes, effectively thematic headings (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). In this study, whilst acknowledging researchers’ influence on shaping analysis, 
we attempted to code data without fitting them into analytic preconceptions. One 
researcher constructed initial codes, listed these with central illustrative verbatim 
quotations, scrutinised and ordered them into analytical hierarchies, and thus 
established core themes. Another team-member took a percentage of the quotations 
and grouped them into the previously identified core themes, then differences were 
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debated until the coders agreed. We were alert to deviant cases, testing them against 
the main themes, to ensure a thorough account of the data was attained (Green and 
Thorogood, 2004). For example, an initial code was “ambivalence about the TFD”; 
during the constant comparison of data, this code was split into two core themes, so 
that we now discuss participants’ endorsement of the TFD separately from their 
awareness of quality issues with the evidence base. One participant was deviant in the 
sense they were willing to explicitly refute research evidence if it did not fit their view 
of the TFD’s usefulness (discussed below). However, there was broad overlap in the 
responses across all participants. We have not quantitatively summarised the breadth 
of occurrence as this suggests a representativeness which can ignore how themes’ 
strengths were also expressed by different degrees of fervour (Wenger, 1988; Gabe et 
al, 2002). In the bulk of the Results section we organise our presentation according to 
these themes, first presenting key quotations with minimal commentary and then 
providing a deeper analysis linking the themes together.  We begin the Results, 
however, by providing a brief quantitative analysis of the ratings part of the interview.  
 
Results 
Ratings  
Participants expressed a range of views on the extent to which post-
compulsory mathematical study would be expected to influence performance on the 
13 general reasoning tasks.  Median ratings for the tasks ranged from 2 to 5, and are 
presented in Table 2. The ratings for each task were compared to 3 (‘neither agree nor 
disagree’) using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. All but four tasks (problem-solving, 
argument evaluation, Watson Glaser evaluation and Raven’s Matrices) were rated 
significantly above 3 (ps < .030, see Table 2), indicating that participants expected 
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studying mathematics to improve performance on the majority of the tasks. 
Interestingly, the tasks that participants expected performance to be improved on were 
quite varied; from formal to informal and abstract to contextual, including the abstract 
conditional inference task, the plausible estimation task, and the Watson Glaser 
recognising assumptions task. This provides a first indication that the participants did, 
to some extent, endorse the TFD: they expected mathematical study to improve at 
least some general reasoning skills.  
 
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
 
Interview theme: Endorsement of the TFD 
Participants’ views on the TFD were varied and nuanced both across the group 
and within individual statements.  Nevertheless, all participants gave several clear 
endorsements of the TFD, citing specific transferrable skills that they believed were 
developed by mathematical study. These skills included: abstract thinking; mental 
modelling of complex problems; considering all possible solutions to a problem; and 
structuring arguments rationally.   
Participant 4:  
I believe that that ability to learn, to control and manipulate abstract ideas in 
a logical and analytical way, I believe that is a process you do get better at as 
you do more mathematics. 
Participant 5:  
[I] expect overall maths students at whatever level to do, to do better [at 
problem-solving]. Because I would expect them to be able to actually carry 
out a systematic process. 
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Participant 2 (considering the Wason Selection Task, which involves card 
turning):  
Yes, I think [mathematics] would help with that because you consider all 
possibilities before you turned it over, and that’s what you’re used to doing in 
maths; you’re thinking of all the possibilities – and do I need to do that? So I 
think maths would help with that. 
 Participant 1: 
I think without any doubt [mathematics] probably does give you some 
structure to the way you think about things that perhaps some other people 
that haven’t had some sort of mathematical training don’t have…And without 
any doubt I do believe that mathematical training gives you a process for 
going about problem-solving. 
Some participants defended the TFD on the grounds that non-mathematicians 
can exhibit inferior analytical skills.  
Participant 1:  
In conversations that I’ve had with people who are not mathematical they can 
argue in very odd ways sometimes. I'm not saying you wouldn’t see it with 
mathematicians but I have seen it with people who are not mathematically 
trained. 
Comments like all of these were common across the interviews, and arose in 
response to both the rating task and the open-ended questions.  They provide more 
detailed evidence that the participants endorsed the TFD: they explicitly stated that 
they expected mathematical study to improve skills in both detailed reasoning and 
higher-level structuring of problem solving activity.  
Interview theme: Mathematics and employability 
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Several participants argued in favour of the TFD in an indirect way, citing the 
fact that employers value mathematics because it improves critical and logical skills 
which then translate to problem-solving in the workplace.  
Participant 1:  
…the country wants people who can look at these real problems and extract 
something sensible from this mess of real world data, do something useful with 
it to get some hopefully sensible answers out of it…And obviously you can do 
that in any walk of life. But I think that the maths training is what gives you 
the ability to do that. 
Participant 5: 
…it’s quite clear that people outside the maths community agree [with the 
value of mathematics]…when the leading finance houses are looking to recruit 
people they recruit people with maths PhDs or physics PhDs. As opposed to 
people with business studies PhDs. 
Whether employers value mathematicians for their general critical and logical 
skills, or because they possess knowledge of specific procedures, for example, 
modelling skills, are not mutually exclusive possibilities – good modellers need to be 
critical and logical, and criticality and logical thought might be enhanced by the 
ability to build good models. The participants collectively gave a sense of the 
subtleties of this argument.  Some acknowledged that the formal critical and logical 
skills encouraged by studying mathematics are not necessarily the same as those 
required in the workplace but are closely linked, so that studying mathematics makes 
students valuable and capable employees.   
Participant 7:  
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I think people who have got a good quality mathematics degree well, they’re 
in demand from all sorts of employers and not because they need their 
students to know about group theory or metric spaces but because they can do 
these things and obviously I’m kind of relying on just the fact that they keep 
employing them as being evidence that they are useful but I would imagine 
that if I was an employer and I needed people who were going to be logical, 
critical, analytical and be able to solve problems and I saw somebody who 
had a good class maths degree I think they would be a good bet.’ 
Participant 5:  
An awful lot of jobs which don’t have any overtly mathematical sort of 
elements to them are actually about using models. And a lot of them are 
spreadsheet models but you are putting data in and you are getting answers 
out and you, the user, are expected to make judgments about the 
reasonableness of the answer or to notice when a notice is completely off the 
rails and are meant to then actually make decisions sort of interpret them…in 
terms of making a decision about whether you repair something or whether 
you change the setting on a production machine or whatever…And so you 
know mathematics is contributing and…it’s not necessarily critical thinking 
and logical reasoning it’s, it’s perhaps more on the problem-solving, 
modelling side of things…But, certainly a lot of the work that’s been done 
recently in terms of looking at people in the workplace is saying that there is a 
lot of hidden maths and that, that the people…As they are carrying it out don’t 
actually identify it as maths but when we…look at what they’re doing we can 
identify them as actually carrying out mathematical thinking and…using 
mathematical skills. 
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 Participant 8:  
…undoubtedly, in practice, out there it’s used as a way of sorting out people 
and these are very hardnosed finance people and business people...and they 
use mathematics as a sieve. Now, they might not know why but it presumably 
has worked quite well. 
This last point is perhaps more cynical but it does relate to the broader issue 
that in Western societies, high mathematical performance is sometimes viewed as a 
proxy measure for general intelligence or capability.  Given the limited available 
evidence, this is not unreasonable: Inglis and Simpson (2009) did find that 
undergraduate mathematics students entered university with higher IQ measures than 
students in their comparison group.  But it calls into question the value of the indirect 
employability argument as support for the TFD: mathematics students might be 
employable because they had good general thinking skills before they began their 
studies rather than because they developed them during those studies.  Of course, the 
points the participants made about modelling have a different status, but even they are 
limited by real-world considerations, as noted next. 
Interview theme: Limitations of the TFD 
No participant completely disagreed with the TFD but most did make 
comments about its limitations, citing real world factors that influence how one learns 
and employs critical and logical skills.  Some cited the simple point that a person who 
is capable of employing strong logical reasoning might not always do so.  
Participant 7:  
In my experience being good at maths wouldn’t make you better at doing this 
[statistical reasoning/admissions task]…the skills that you develop from doing 
maths are far outweighed by, in my experience, all sorts of things that come to 
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bear when you have to make such a decision. Gut feeling, money…Does the 
Department need any more dosh?  Whether the person, whether the 
disagreement, you know personalities get in the way but these things are not 
necessarily relevant, I don’t know…you can be perfectly capable of logical 
reasoning and still be capable of making an irrational decision.’ 
Some recognised pedagogical issues, noting that different programmes might 
focus on different skills, and that some teacher intentions might be subverted by 
learner actions if a syllabus allows students to succeed without really engaging with 
the intellectual content.   
 Participant 7:  
I think it’s possible to pass a maths degree, particularly a joint honours maths 
degree, without developing many of these [logical and critical reasoning 
skills] to a particularly high level. 
Participant 8:  
I’m reluctant to give a causal claim because...when you say ‘mathematics 
training disciplines’, I’m an educator, it depends what the bloomin’ training 
is. It depends on what mathematics you’ve done.  
Participant 5:  
If maths graduates aren’t doing better on these [tasks] than non-maths 
graduates then I yeah I think we are doing something wrong. 
 Many participants thought that whilst the TFD is reasonable, studying other 
disciplines might be as good or even better for training students in certain skills, 
particularly those associated with verbal reasoning.   
 Participant 5:  
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 ‘I would expect physics students to do better than maths students on a question 
like this [plausible estimation] because they are much more used to dealing 
with imprecision and making reasonable estimates for things that they don’t 
always know. Whereas you know in A-level maths you never, there is never a 
requirement to sort of put in something reasonable because you always know 
what it is exactly. 
Participant 2:  
I mean things like somebody that’s doing a programming degree I would 
imagine it’s very, very logical there, so potentially there are other tools and 
some of them may be better.  I don’t know that maths is necessarily the best to 
teach logical thinking. 
 Participant 1:  
I think you know if you’re going to try and you know if you’re going to take 
say for example the study of anatomy seriously and you want to know where 
all the blood vessels go and what serves what in the body I mean that’s quite a 
deep analytical process to know what affects what in the body isn't it? So I 
would imagine that somebody who’d done a thorough study of something like 
that… had developed very logical and critical reasoning skills. 
 Participant 7:  
I think if I wasn’t a mathematician I’d find [belief bias syllogisms task] much 
easier to answer. I mean I’m trying to apply a logical reasoning to this 
question and this task. I can believe that you can be really good at 
mathematics and find this task really rather difficult because you are trying to 
make some assumptions about the person who said it.  
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 These quotations show that participants did not necessarily privilege 
mathematics above other subjects, although, as evidenced by their hedging (‘I expect’ 
and ‘I think’ rather than ‘I know’) many were concerned about their ability to 
comment on other disciplines.  Several stated within the same interview that although 
they think that maths may be better at teaching certain skills, it is very difficult to tell 
for certain at the moment. Some were comfortable with this state of affairs, e.g. 
Participant 2 stated: ‘so I don’t feel uncomfortable about it [making TFD claims on a 
prospectus], and it’s a kind of accepted thought really nowadays isn’t it, that that’s 
what is going on.’ Others probed for more evidence, discussed below. 
Interview theme: Causality and evidence  
As might be expected from highly educated individuals, participants were alert 
to the difficulties associated with disentangling cause and effect: most discussed the 
possibility that there is simply a filtering effect in operation.   
Participant 5:  
‘I would say that the reason…why students are good at maths and therefore 
tend to study it is because they have got these sorts of skills that enable them 
to, to recognize patterns that being something that fundamentally underlies a 
lot of mathematics.  So, I’m not sure that, that doing maths A-level would have 
developed these skills. But the fact that you have got these skills makes, I 
would suggest makes you more likely to have done maths A-level in the first 
place.’  
Participant 2:  
What I’m not clear about here is the chicken and egg situation, so I’m not 
clear whether or not people that go into maths are already logical. 
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Some participants were nevertheless inclined to defend the TFD, and were 
reluctant to engage with the idea that it might lack a strong evidence base as they were 
worried about reducing perceptions of the value of mathematics. When asked how 
they would respond if there was little evidence for the TFD, some expressed 
nervousness or were inclined to seek extra-mathematical reasons why the evidence 
might not exist.   
Participant 4:  
It’s a very important question [whether the TFD is accurate]. It makes one a 
bit nervous in case the answer is no. [When asked for a reaction to the 
possibility that the current research team’s work could undermine the TFD] I 
think we might well suppress your evidence by ignoring it.’  
This was the most extreme response to the notion that the TFD may not be 
entirely accurate.  More typical were responses that began to explain a lack of 
evidence by considering that the nature of mathematical learning could be the issue:  
Participant 8: 
Is it that too much is being done by routine or by rote or by spotting the exam 
question and not really getting to grips with actually doing maths? It sounds a 
bit of an excuse but that’s what my reaction would be. 
Nearly all participants were aware that they were evaluating the TFD using 
exactly the kind of personal reasoning that the TFD is supposed to ameliorate against.  
The two quotations below are typical of those that arose across the interviews. 
Participant 6:  
I am quite a firm supporter of it [TFD] really…it’s just my own experience of 
studying the subject really’  
Participant 4:  
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I’m finding it’s difficult for me to answer these saying what people with a 
maths degree would have and to separate that from what I would find 
difficult’.  
It is naturally very difficult to put aside one’s personal knowledge when 
discussing a concept (e.g. Seidman, 1998; Charmaz, 2000, 2006; Henwood and 
Pidgeon, 2006) and it is interesting that these participants who had studied 
mathematics to a high level still find it so, even when debating whether studying 
mathematics makes one more able to carry out such ‘putting aside’. To what extent 
this might matter – especially if mathematics education advocates are aware how 
strongly they are being influenced by their own experiences – is another question, 
beyond the scope of the current study but worth of consideration by future work on 
both the evidence base for the TFD and what to do with this evidence.  
Summary  
Semi-structured interviews with eight expert participants allowed us to draw 
out four themes in relation to the extent to which the TFD is endorsed by mathematics 
education advocates.  These were: broad endorsement of the TFD, indirect evidence 
via employability of mathematics graduates, limitations of the TFD (personal and 
pedagogical factors that might restrict its accuracy), and views on causality and 
evidence. We discuss each of these themes in turn before drawing them together and 
considering the implications of our findings. 
Firstly, we identified unambiguous endorsements of the TFD across all of our 
interviews.  Participants justified these endorsements by focusing on the subject 
knowledge undergraduates gain, combined with the benefits of the training and 
practice they receive in abstract reasoning, logical deduction and problem-solving.  
They did not believe it had universally large effects: they collectively rated 
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mathematics as more supportive of some types of reasoning development and less 
obviously linked to others.  But they did clearly believe that post-compulsory 
mathematical study supported the development of general reasoning skills across at 
least some task types. 
Secondly, many participants spontaneously considered other evidence for the 
value of post-compulsory mathematical study, usually via objective data showing 
positive employment patterns for mathematics undergraduates. Some explicitly linked 
workplace success to mathematical skills, stating that many of the latter are directly 
transferable to a wide variety of jobs. Others argued that whilst many jobs may not 
use mathematical subject knowledge directly, mathematics graduates are highly 
valuable because their skills enable transfer of generic reasoning ability and problem-
solving.  At least some were aware, however, that this argument did not directly 
justify the TFD: valuing mathematics graduates’ skills is not necessarily the same as 
valuing their training. 
Thirdly, this point about mathematical training was elaborated upon by the 
participants’ comments on possible limitations of the TFD.  They noted that real 
world constraints, such as financial and political pressures, can impede rationality, 
that people capable of reasoning logically might fail to do so, and that mathematics 
might not be special: other disciplines might also teach skills in logical reasoning, and 
might even be of more value for at least some types of verbal problem.  
Fourthly and finally, there was substantial ambivalence about causality and 
evidence in relation to the TFD.  Participants were concerned about ascribing 
causation when it could be the case that people who are already good at reasoning are 
naturally and disproportionately filtered in to studying mathematics; in this respect 
their comments reflect issues raised in the research literature, as discussed in Section 
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2.  Some were also concerned about the extent to which the TFD is really justified. 
They felt they could not evaluate other disciplines’ contributions to reasoning skills as 
well as they could reflect upon those of their own subject, and they recognized that as 
mathematically trained people they were prejudiced: they wanted to agree with the 
TFD.  Some were discomfited by the suggestion that the TFD might be based on little 
evidence: they expressed unease that there might be evidence against it and, rather 
than consider that it might be inaccurate, were inclined to suggest that this evidence 
might be flawed or that syllabi may not allow sufficient practice of the right kind of 
skills.  
 
Discussion 
There has long been support for the idea that studying mathematics improves 
reasoning skills: the TFD has stood effectively unchallenged for centuries in 
philosophical treatises and for decades in educational policy documents.  There is no 
doubt that it has face validity in contemporary education: our participants offered 
thoughtful and nuanced commentary on its likely accuracy, but all broadly agreed 
with the central claim.   
We do not seek in this paper to suggest that the TFD is fundamentally 
incorrect or that our participants are unreasonable to believe it.  Indeed, these 
interviews took place at the beginning of our own work in this area, and (as noted in 
the Section 2) our investigation of conditional reasoning in A-level students did 
demonstrate an improvement for those studying mathematics: mathematics and 
English literature A-level students did not differ on a conditional reasoning task at the 
start of post-compulsory education, but the mathematics students improved over their 
first year of study while the English students did not (Attridge & Inglis, 2013).  This 
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suggests that mathematical study aids the development of at least this type of 
reasoning; that it does more than filter in ‘good reasoners’.   
We also recognise the limitations of our study: its sample size and sampling 
strategy limit the transferability of findings, and having a participant body composed 
of volunteers arising from purposive sampling may lead to systematic bias (Farmer 
and Lawrenson, 2004). Our participants immersed themselves in the interviews, 
providing thorough responses in their commitment to the research, and we have 
provided a description of participants’ contexts so that readers may assess whether the 
findings are applicable to their areas of interest (Patton, 2002).  But it remains 
possible that there exist individuals in similar positions in the UK or internationally 
who would be considerably more sceptical about the TFD or who would raise 
different questions about its limitations. Our sample represents a particular group of 
advocates for mathematics education only and we note that engineering or STEM 
advocates more generally might be very different to this group.  
What we do want to do is to highlight the fact that big educational claims are 
sometimes made on the basis of very little evidence, and that the sweeping nature of 
claims like the TFD might in fact mask a host of interesting questions about the 
details of knowledge development.  It is quite plausible, for instance, that different 
mathematical topics, pedagogies or cultures support the development of different 
general reasoning skills: perhaps the study of core topics in A-level mathematics 
improves conditional reasoning, but other topics have better effects for this or other 
types of task. For example, in Cyprus where the 16-18 mathematics curriculum has a 
substantial deductive geometry component, students’ abstract conditional reasoning 
skills improved in line with the normative model of the conditional to a greater extent 
than in A-level students in the UK (Attridge, Doritou & Inglis, 2015; Attridge & 
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Inglis, 2013). The Cypriot students also showed a reduction in belief bias on a 
thematic syllogisms task (Attridge, Doritou & Inglis, 2015).  Possibilities of this 
nature should truly interest mathematics education advocates, who could use evidence 
to provide detailed recommendations about preparation that might benefit students 
with different existing skills and different career aspirations.  Our findings also relate 
to the ideologies of mathematics education proposed by Ernest (1991) and perhaps 
suggest that at least some advocates implicitly endorse a public educator view of 
mathematics. At present there is no reason to abandon belief in the TFD, but there is 
compelling reason to pick apart its components and work towards research-informed 
curriculum recommendations.  
In conclusion, it seems that there is still support for the TFD in the UK 
mathematics education policy community, but that advocates are aware of its 
limitations. Our participants also raised and expressed interest in open research 
questions, such as which areas of mathematics are most effective at developing 
reasoning skills, how effective other subjects like physics and philosophy are in 
developing reasoning skills, and whether some curricula might actually reduce the 
development of reasoning skills by focusing on rote learning.  These questions 
provide mathematics education researchers with a rich source of inspiration for future 
investigations.  
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Endnotes 
1. Although not actually using that term. 
2. A-levels are optional two-year courses taken after compulsory education ends 
at the age of 16 in the UK; students usually take three or four A-levels in 
chosen subjects and many students study no mathematics at this stage.   
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Appendix. 
Task examples given to participants. 
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Participant 
no. 
Role in mathematics community, with affiliations 
Participant 1 Academic mathematician, textbook writer. 
HEA Mathematics, Statistics and Operational Research Subject 
Centre. 
Participant 2 Academic mathematician  
Council of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications. 
Participant 3 Academic mathematician, textbook writer 
Education Committee of the Institute of Mathematicians and its 
Applications 
Education Committee of the London Mathematical Society. 
Participant 4 Academic mathematician  
HEA Mathematics, Statistics and Operational Research Subject 
Centre. 
Participant 5 Academic mathematician  
Senior manager at a teaching focused university 
HEA Mathematics, Statistics and Operational Research Subject 
Centre. 
Participant 6 Member of Parliament with an interest in education policy 
Participant 7 Academic mathematician 
Senior manager at a research intensive university 
Council of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications. 
Participant 8 Academic mathematics educator  
Council of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications  
Contributor to several influential reports on mathematics education 
 
Table 1. Participants’ roles within the mathematics education community. 
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Task Mean (Std Dev) Min Max z p 
Conditional Inference 4.75 (0.46) 4 5 2.64 .008 
Belief Bias Syllogisms 4.75 (0.71) 3 5 2.65 .008 
Wason Selection Task 4.50 (0.76) 3 5 2.46 .014 
Plausible Estimation 4.38 (0.74) 3 5 2.43 .015 
Wason’s THOG task 4.25 (0.71) 3 5 2.43 .015 
Watson Glaser Interpretation 4.25 (0.71) 3 5 2.43 .015 
Statistical Reasoning 4.13 (0.99) 2 5 2.17 .030 
Cognitive Reflection Test 4.13 (0.64) 3 5 2.46 .014 
Watson Glaser Assumptions 4.00 (0.76) 3 5 2.27 .023 
Argument Evaluation Task 3.50 (1.07) 2 5 1.27 .206 
Watson Glaser Evaluation 3.38 (1.01) 2 5 1.00 .317 
Raven’s Matrices 3.13 (1.36) 1 4 .176 .860 
Problem Solving 2.38 (1.30) 1 5 -1.18 .238 
 
Table 2. Mean ratings for the extent to which studying advanced mathematics would 
improve performance on each task, from 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree). 
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Figure 1. Quotes shown to participants for discussion. 
